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Measurement of 
Competitiveness Degree in 
Tunisian Deposit Banks:  
An Application of the Panzar 
and Rosse Model 
 
Summary: This paper explores the use of the Panzar-Rosse statistic as a 
basis for empirical assessment of competitive conditions among Tunisian de-
posit banks. The elaborated model has been tested with an interest revenues
equation and a total revenues equation. Proceeding by means of an Ordinary
Least Square analysis, the H-statistics is respectively estimated at 0.87 and
0.91. The computations undertaken using bank fixed effects and bank random
effects General Least Square methods yield similar results. With reference to
the reviewed literature, we are inclined to believe that Tunisian banks imple-
ment neither a joint monopoly nor a collusive competition context, and that they 
evolve within an oligopolistic competition context in a contestable market. Thus,
it confirms the presence of a competitive environment.
Key words: Tunisia, Banking competition, Contestability, Panzar-Rosse statis-
tic, Panel data. 




Economics literature concerned with the problem of competitiveness measurement is 
divided into two types of studies: those that adopt a structural or informal approach 
and those that privilege a non-structural or a formal approach.  
The structural approach focuses on the parameters of Structure-Conduct-
Performance (SCP). The SCP hypothesis causally relates market structure and prices 
fixing behaviour. The SCP model has two hypotheses: the first assumes that market 
structure affects conduct, while the second hypothesis stipulates that it is the conduct 
which influences performance. The implications of these two hypotheses lead us to 
suspect that banking industry concentration may generate a market power allowing 
banks an opportunity to reduce interest rates over deposits and to favour interest rates 
over loans, internally yielding monopolistic profits.   
The non-structural approach is characterized by the frequent use of two tech-
niques that allow for the measurement of degree of competitiveness. The first tech-
nique is developed by Timothy F. Bresnahan (1982) and Lawrence J. Lau (1982), the 
second is developed by John C. Panzar and James N. Rosse (1987). The Bresnahan’s 
model is a general market equilibrium model. The model is based on maximising 
firms’ profits at equilibrium. The prices and quantities are determined according to 190  Sami Mensi 
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the marginal costs equal marginal revenue rule, an aspect that coincides with price 
demand under pure and perfect competition, or coincides with marginal revenue un-
der monopoly.   
The procedure suggested by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) needs an esti-
mation of a model based on simultaneous equations over industry-driven data. A pa-
rameter representing the degree of market power is included. Empirical implementa-
tion of this technique is found throughout a number of studies, of which we mention 
Sherrill Shaffer (1993). The second technique is that of Panzar and Rosse (1987); it 
is based on the “H-statistic”. The PR method examines the relationship between price 
variations and the revenue of a specific bank.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the Panzar-Rosse the-
ory and presents the advantages of their H-statistic. Section 2 surveys the literature 
on competitive conditions using PR methodology. Section 3 presents the context of 
the Tunisian Banking industry. Section 4 provides the empirical analysis. Section 5 
draws conclusions of the analysis. 
 
1. The Theory of Panzar and Rosse 
 
The Panzar and Rosse model (1987) is the first technique issued on the new theory of 
industrial organization and applied to the case of banks. Panzar and Rosse obtained 
measurements of market power, as well as competition conditions in a sector, by 
studying the impact of variations in production factors prices over revenues of the 
sector’s entities. The Panzar and Rosse’s approach is based on the idea that banks 
employ different strategies based upon the price, in response to changes in input 
costs of the market structure in which they operate.  
In order to measure competitiveness of the banking industry, Panzar and 
Rosse (1987) define the competitiveness H measure as the sum of the elasticities of 
the reduced form bank revenue equations with respect to the bank's input prices. Spe-
cifically, the H-statistic measures the percentage of change in the equilibrium reve-
nue of a bank generated by a change of 1 percent in entry costs.  
In a case of a perfect competition, the H-statistic is 1. This situation might 
emerge with an oligopoly operating in a contestable market. In situations of pure and 
perfect competition, applying the hypothesis that companies produce a long-term 
equilibrium level, an increase in production factors prices creates an increase propor-
tional to revenues. This takes into account the fact that the output volume minimising 
average costs does not vary, whereas the price of this output evolves in the same pro-
portion of input production prices.  
If the market, in which banks operate, is characterized as being a monopole, 
then the H-statistic is inferior or equal to zero. This is due to economic intuitions 
which stipulate that revenue of a monopole negatively induces a change in market 
entry costs. In fact, an increase of 1 percent in entry costs leads to an increase of 1 
percent in marginal costs, which reduces production and revenue equilibrium. There-
fore, when the costs of a company operating in a monopolistic or collusive market 
increase, this entity raises its prices, taking into account conditions proper to its situa-
tion as a monopole, and its revenues diminish. The authors illustrate that in the case 
of a market monopole, this environment forces a situation in which an increase in 191  Measurement of Competitiveness Degree in Tunisian Deposit Banks: An Application of the Panzar and Rosse Model 
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input prices causes increase in marginal costs, thus reducing the level of equilibrium 
and revenues provision. Accordingly, sensitivity of revenues is null, or even nega-
tive.  
In the third case, Panzar and Rosse distinguish a monopolistic situation where 
banks act as monopoles, but entry or exit of other banks with imperfect competitive 
products often produces a null profit. In this case, the H value falls between 0 and 1 
given that revenues increase less proportionally to changes in the entry cost levels. If 
the company evolves towards a monopolistic competition context, its response to a 
rise in sector-level costs will be situated between the above-mentioned figures. The 
same theory applies for its revenue index. Given this, the effect of a rise in revenue 
costs will be positive, but less proportional.  
Luis Gutiérrez de Rozas (2007) schematically presents the different interpreta-







Source: Gutiérrez de Rozas (2007, p. 15). 
 
 
Figure 1  Interpretation of H- Statistic 
 
An important advantage of the PR methodology is that it does not require the 
price of production and data on quantities that are not often available or expensive to 
obtain. In this case we assume input and revenue prices are easy to obtain (Hannah S. 
Hempell 2002). 
We can mention another advantage of the model. Indeed, the PR model allows 
the inclusion of specific bank factors in the production function as well as it allows 
for the examination of the differences which may arise between banks at the level of 
size (small vs large banks) or at the level of ownership (domestic vs foreign banks or 
public vs private banks).  
From another perspective, we put focus on the non-need to detect the market 
and the non-need to specifically define the notion of a local market, which relieves us 
from the consequences of an inaccurate specification. The H-statistic reflects the av-
erage behaviour of banks in each market, in the case that the bank operates in several 
markets. Jose Negrin et al. (2006) align to these arguments and assert that authors 192  Sami Mensi 
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often opt for a market definition with reference to corresponding specific activities. 
On the whole, the authors judge the H-statistics as a statistic which does not lack ef-
ficiency, despite its simplicity and transparency.  
Incontestably, does the choice of this technique for the estimation of competi-
tiveness degree observed over bank markets come with serious theoretical and em-
pirical hypotheses? Jacob A. Bikker and Katharina Haaf (2000) establish four condi-
tions in order for the approach to be retained: (1) banks operate for their long-term 
equilibrium, (2) performance of banks is influenced by actions of other market play-
ers, (3) the structure of the cost is homogeneous and (4) demand price elasticity is 
superior to 1.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Recently, an increasing number of researchers have focused their attention on re-
searching and analyzing competition within the banking industry. The new pheno-
mena of liberalization within an increasing number of countries, financial and other 
internationalization initiatives contributed to explaining this particular interest in the 
subject. Kent Mattews, Victor Murinde, and Tianshu Zhao (2007) witnessed that the 
SCP and Efficient Structure are misleading models when they are set to analyse 
competition behaviour by means of profitability. According to these authors, it is by 
the means of analysing output price deviation, in relation to cost margin, that an ade-
quate theoretical frame is established.  
The first instrument issued from the new theory of industrial organisation ap-
plied to banking is the Panzar and Rosse (1987) model. Upon the emergence of this 
approach, theorists have quickly adopted into the study of banking systems’ competi-
tiveness. A number of research studies have privileged and applied the PR methodol-
ogy to European banking systems (Jukka Vesala 1995; Olivier De Bandt and Philip 
E. Davis 2000; Bikker and Johannes M. Groeneveld 2000; Bikker and Haaf 2002; 
Hempell 2002; Barbara Casu and Claudia Girardone 2006; Negrin et al. 2006; 
Gutiérrez de Rozas 2007; Mattews, Murinde, and Zhao 2007; Semih H. Yildirim and 
George C. Philippatos 2007) to American and Canadian banking systems respec-
tively for Shaffer (1982) and particularly for Alli Nathan and Edwin  H.  Neave 
(1989), and to Asian countries like the case of Philip Molyneux, John Thornton, and 
Michael D. Lloyd-Williams (1996), Ananthakrishnan Prasad and Saibal Ghosh 
(2005), Yuan Yuan (2006) papers. However, papers which treat emerging countries, 
Arab countries and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region countries are less 
abundant in the literature (Gaston  R.  Gelos and Jorge Roldos 2004; Saeed Al-
Muharrami, Kent Mathews, and Yusuf Khabari 2006; Louis Kasekende et al. 2009; 
Rima Turk-Ariss 2009).  
Whereas results vary between studies, these latter generally reject perfect col-
lusion and perfect competition. The majority is inclined to support a monopolistic 
competition. According to Gutiérrez de Rozas (2007), Bikker and Haaf (2002), and 
others
1, monopolistic competition is the most plausible framework able to character-
                                                        
1 There are many studies on the competitiveness of banking systems using Panzar and Rosse as shown in 
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ize interactions between banks. This theory is supported under the idea, that takes 
into account the existence of product differentiation, and it fits the idea that banks 
tend to be different in as far as variables of product quality and promotion are con-
cerned, despite the homogeneity of its principal activity. The limit of a monopolistic 
competition is seen when banks provide products that are perfectly substitutable. 
One of the first applications of the PR methodology on banking is that of 
Shaffer’s (1982), who based herself on the foundation of the methodology developed 
in Panzar and Rosse’s (1977) article. Shaffer (1982) applied this approach to a sam-
ple of banking firms established in New York in 1979 and has estimated the H-
statistics value between 0.32 and 0.36. This result indicates that the banks do behave 
neither as a monopole nor as banks in perfect competition, and that they are in a mo-
nopolistic competition. Similarly, Nathan and Neave (1989) have studied competi-
tion within the Canadian financial industry (banks, insurance companies…) using 
data from 1982 to 1984. In so far as commercial banks are concerned, the authors 
confirmed that the H-statistic took the values 1.058 in 1982, 0.68 in 1983 and 0.729 
in 1984. Following these H-statistics, they rejected the two hypotheses of monopole 
and pure and perfect competition and they concluded that Canadian commercial 
banks evolve within a monopolistic competition. Yuan (2006) measures the degree of 
competition within the Chinese banking sector using the PR methodology before 
China became a member to the World Trade Organization and this from 1996 to 
2000. Like Stijin Claessens and Luc Laeven (2004) and Bikker and Haaf (2002), the 
H-statistics have been elaborated in a way which would allow for international com-
parisons. On the whole, the Chinese banking system is characterized by a situation 
close to a perfect competition with a relatively higher level than that shown in previ-
ous studies. This study illustrates that the Chinese banking sector is competitive dur-
ing the years 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2000. In 1998, despite the high value of the H-
statistics, competition is monopolistic. Molyneux, Thornton, and Lloyd-Williams 
(1996) used PR statistics to evaluate competition conditions in a number of European 
banking markets. This large-scale study incorporated a great deal of variables in or-
der to control for risk, cost and size characteristics of the studied institutions. A sam-
ple of German, French, Italian, Spanish and British banks has been considered for the 
period 1986-1989. The paper concluded that a monopolistic competition prevailed 
the British banking market. Similar results have been obtained for the other European 
markets. Molyneux, Thornton, and Lloyd-Williams (1996) observed the Japanese 
commercial banks’ competition behaviour and obtained the following results; for the 
year 1986, they proved that H=0,0193 and for the year 1988, H=0,6353; these two 
values are different from zero and the unit, thus concluding that Japanese commercial 
banks are in monopolistic competition and that the other two hypotheses of mono-
pole and pure and perfect competition be rejected. As for Bikker and Groeneveld 
(2000), they measured the H-statistics for a number of European Union (EU) banks. 
This statistic is estimated on the one hand for all EU banks and on the other hand for 
each individual country during the period 1989-1996. Monopolistic competition be-
haviour is detected for the majority of European banking markets. The authors as-
sume the existence of a monopolistic competition, but with varying degrees for EU 
countries. Among the recent studies, De Bandt and Davis (2000) developed a new 194  Sami Mensi 
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model to examine competition within EU banking market
2, using data from the pe-
riod 1992-1996. This study has been conducted on large and small banks. De Bandt 
and Davis’ (2000) results and conclusions support the hypothesis that European 
banks are less competitive than American banks. As for small banks, competition 
level seems particularly less elevated in France and Germany. This suggests that in 
these countries small banks have market power, probably due to the fact that they 
lend more interest to local markets. In Italy, a monopolistic competition has governed 
small and large banks. Among the novelties reported by the authors is the fact of hav-
ing made their conclusions on two different dependent variables i.e. interest income 
and total income. Since that, a big number of studies adopted their approach. Like 
Bikker and Haaf (2002) and Vesala (1995), who applied to the PR model two groups 
of different banks, i.e. small and large banks, Negrin et al. (2006) have conducted a 
similar study on Mexican banking sector. The innovation consisted in subdividing 
banks, not only according to their size, but also according to sources of income, in 
other words, the different components of income. David Hauner and Shanaka  J. 
Peiris (2006) investigate the banking sector in Uganda and find that the level of com-
petitiveness has significantly increased over time. Al-Muharrami, Mathews, and 
Khabari (2006) concerned themselves with the study of market structure and compe-
tition behaviour within the banking system of the Gulf countries. The authors evalu-
ate banks’ monopole power over a decade untill 2002. Six countries have been re-
tained on which the authors applied the usual concentration measurement, the k bank 
concentration ratio (CRk) and Herfindhal-Hirschman’s index (HHI). They, however, 
used the H-statistics of the PR model to measure monopolistic power. The results 
suggest that for Qatar, Bahrain and Oman, banks operate in a monopolistic competi-
tion. As for Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE), competition 
between banks touches on a perfect competition. Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) 
analyse 14 Central and East European banking systems using banking data and apply 
the PR methodology. Among these, we mention Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Russia and 
Yugoslavia. The sample includes a panel of 2113 observations belonging to 325 
banks over the period 1993-2000. They proved that, except for Latvia, Macedonia 
and Lithuania, these systems are characterized neither by a perfect competition nor 
by a monopolistic one. On the whole, large banks of economies in transition operate 
in a more competitive environment compared to small banks
3. Mattews, Murinde, 
and Zhao (2007) conducted an empirical study using the PR model over 12 large 
British banks during a period of major structural changes between 1980 and 2004. 
The robustness of the results is confirmed by Lerner’s index. The theoretical model 
of monopolistic competition characterises competition between British banks during 
the whole period, yet its intensity remains unchanged during the 1980-1990 decade. 
Over the non-core (off-balance sheet) business, competition is shown less intensive. 
                                                        
2 The authors show a particular interest to France, Germany and Italy. They seek to evaluate the impacts 
of the Monetary and Economic Union on market conditions and this for banks of the countries adopting 
the common currency.  
3 The authors have defined the two sub-markets basing themselves on the size of capital; large and small 
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To our knowledge, no previously published paper took Tunisia as its focus. How-
ever, the paper of Turk-Ariss (2009) attempted to examine competition structures of 
the MENA region countries’ banking sectors of which Tunisia is a part. Based on 
revenue elasticity to input prices, and retaining a set of market and contestability in-
dicators, the degree of competition measured during the period 2000-2006 demon-
strates that the region is characterised, for the most part, by a monopolistic competi-
tion. The exceptions exist for Bahrain and Turkey, which exhibit perfectly competi-
tive markets, and the North African countries (Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco) where 
monopole conditions are observed.  
   
3. Banking Industry in Tunisia  
 
During the 1960s, socialist-driven economic policies adopted by Tunisia created a 
number of drawbacks. In addition, these same policies generated distortion of finan-
cial resources, lack of savings allocations towards private investment, a decrease in 
savings rates and an increase of external debt ratio in relation to Gross Domestic 
Product [1961-1967]. In 1970, the socialist inspiration experience came to an end. 
However, the repressive practices of the financial system lasted until 1987. Starting 
from this date, the authorities adopted the Structural Adjustment Plan focusing on 
policies of economic restructuring in order to develop bank intermediation and to 
improve the efficiency of the financial system.  
In the context of financial openness, the central bank issued management 
regulations and prudential norms targeting banks and financial institutions
4. These 
norms used return on equity (ROE), ratios of ROE to commitments, cash flow ratios, 
funds given by credit institutions to their branches, and risks in general.  
In the context of reorganizing the banking sector, a modernization program 
was implemented in 1997. The program targets the quality of bank products and ser-
vices in order to face foreign competition. Restructuring and modernizing the bank-
ing sector represented a necessary process as part of the reforms undertaken by the 
Tunisian financial sector. From a technology point of view, new instruments have 
been introduced with the aim of improving bank services, including for example, 
tele-compensation, electronic payment as well as training people on new manage-
ment methods and techniques. During the year 2007, 253 new Automatic Teller Ma-
chines (ATMs) have been installed, increasing the total number of ATMs to 1100.  
Financial globalization is more and more observable in openness, deregula-
tion, disintermediation processes and in the liberalization of the Tunisian economy. 
In parallel, reconciliation efforts have been imposed in order to obtain an important 
size in terms of assets and stock market capitalization, and eventually to achieve 
economies of scale. Putting into effect the merger of The Economic Development 
Bank of Tunisia (BDET) and The National Tourism Development Bank (BNDT) by 
the Tunisian Banking Company (STB) on September 26
th 2000 was without doubt a 
monumental year for the Tunisian banking sector. This merger gave birth to the first 
universal Tunisian bank.  
                                                        
4 In March 1994, banks were submitted to prudential regulations in order to control for change balances. 
In 1997, some prudential regulations have been modified.  196  Sami Mensi 
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In 2007, the banking sector totalled 20 banks; the entry of a new bank named 
“Bank for Financing Small/Medium-sized Businesses” (BFPME) in March 2005, the 
conversion of Tunisian-Saudi Investment and Development Company (STUSID 
Bank) and Tunisian-Libyan Bank (BTL) into universal banks respectively in April 
and October 2005 and privatising the Bank of the South in November 2005. In addi-
tion, deposit banks have continued to develop thanks to the extension of their net-
work in a way which made bank services more accessible. As a result, as of Decem-
ber 2007, the network of bank agencies was 1094 units of which 980 agencies, 20 
branches and 94 offices. This allowed for the improvement of the rate of banking 
which reached 9.6 thousand habitants per agency.  
Performance of deposit banks have yielded an increase in ROE and ROA 
which respectively stand at 6.5 per-cent, 7 per-cent and 8.8 per-cent in 2008, com-
pared to 0.5 per-cent, 0.6 per-cent and 0.9 per-cent respectively in 2005, 2006 and 
2007.  
 
Table 1   Return and Financial Solidity Indicators  
 










Source: Central Bank of Tunisia (2009). 
 
4. Empirical Specification of the PR Model 
 
4.1 Presentation of the Model 
 
This statistical analysis requires the estimation of the reduced form of bank revenue. 
The quantity and price of the equilibrium determining total revenue equilibrium de-
pend on costs, demand and conduct. Accordingly, all determinants of costs and de-
mand must be included in banks’ revenues functions. A particular attention will be 
devoted to the price of factors.  





with :   Wit   = Vector of the price of factors;  
 Z it  = Variables of the cost function;  
 Y it  = The variable of the demand function;  
  it   = Error term.  
 
In this case, Rit / Witk  is a derived total revenue in relation to k
nth input 
price. The H-statistic of the PR model is defined by the sum of the elasticities of the 
reduced form revenue, knowing the price of factors.  
 
(2) 
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In the elaborated model, we preserve the linear form of the relationship be-
tween dependant and independent variables. The works of Claessens and Laeven 
(2004), Prasad and Ghosh (2005), Yuan (2006), Gutiérrez de Rozas (2007) and Turk-
Ariss (2009), have established its theoretical basis.  
The reduced form of the following specification is:  
 
(3)
                                
with :   ln:   The natural operating logarithm;  
IR:   Interests and revenues assimilated over total assets;  
 
PF:   Price of loanable funds is computed as: interests over customers deposits+ 
charges over treasury operations and over inter-banks operations+ charges 
over obligatory, budgetary and external borrowing, +miscellaneous losses 
in relation to borrowing from Central Bank of Tunisia and deposit bonds, 
Banks and specialised entities+ customers’ deposits+ savings deposit+ 
deposit bonds subscribed by customers+ others amounts incurring from 
customers, special and obligatory resources, and other borrowings;  
PL:   Price of labor estimated by personnel expenses is equal to the sum of sala-
ries in relation to the number of employees; 
PK:  Price of capital expenditure is computed as provision and amortization 
donations+ charges over miscellaneous operations in relation to fixed 
capital and gross non-assets amortization; 
SCALE : Ratio of total assets to the sum of banks assets;  
CAPAST: Ratio of capital to bank’s total assets; 
BR:   Ratio of loans to total deposits; 
AG:  Ratio of number of branches (offices and agencies) to total number of 
branches in the country.  
 
The control variables have been introduced to take into account the specific 
characteristics of the bank. The ratio of total assets to the sum of banks assets 
(SCALE) logarithm may be considered as a proxy for the size of the bank, and just 
acts as importantly as an indicator for the incorporated demand. The ratios CAPAST 
and BR have been introduced to take into account the firm’s level of risk. The sign of 
the coefficient associated with the first ratio may be negative or positive, however, 
we are looking for a positive sign of the coefficient associated with the second ratio. 
The number of the bank’s branches to the total number of branches ratio (AG) repre-
sents another useful proxy to evaluate the effect of the size of the bank over reve-
nues. This would allow us to identify the expected sign, which will be positive or 
negative as a function of the effect of the increase or the decrease over revenues rela-
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4.2 Data  
 
The Professional Association of Tunisian Banks is our principal source of data 
through its annual reports. In addition, we have used balance sheets and accounting 
results taken from the banks’ activities reports. The data represents the period 1990-
2007. The choice of the period is a function of the availability of the necessary in-
formation. The two dimensions, i.e. time and individual dimensions, are present 
which leads us to proceed to a panel-based data analysis.  
The sample includes 10 banks. We retained the deposit banks having a regular 
activity over the period under consideration. The sample of banks retained includes 
three public banks, three private banks and four foreign banks. The public banks are; 
the Tunisian Banking Company (STB), Bank of Housing (BH), the National Agricul-
tural Bank (BNA).  The private banks are; International Arab Bank of Tunisia 
(BIAT), Bank of Tunisia (BT), and Amen Bank (A. Bank). The banks with foreign 
participations are; the Banking Union for Trade and Industry (UBCI)
5 and the Arab 
Tunisian Bank (ATB)
6, ATTIJARI Bank of Tunisia




4.3 Econometric Models, Tests and Results  
 
4.3.1 Tests of Conditions of Competition in Interest Revenues 
 
As in Yuan (2006), we follow the interpretation of Bikker and Haaf (2002): “...the 
H-statistic ranges between 0 and 1, and a large value indicates greater competitive 
than a small value, and if the revenue equations, demand elasticity and quantity of 
banks are the same in the various markets, the H-statistic can be used to make com-
parisons by country and size of bank” (p.524), assuming thus that the H-statistic is 
between 0 and 1, and that a larger H-statistic indicates a higher degree of competi-
tion.  
We start with an econometric specification to measure the intensity of compe-
tition over the Tunisian deposit banks market. Given that the model cannot be ap-
plied only in a case of stationary variables, we made recourse to the Unit Root test, 
known as IPShin (Kyung So Im, Hashem M. Pesaran, and Shin Yongcheol 1997). 
The results reported in appendix 2 show that all the variables turned out to be sta-
tionary with an exception (ln AG), and even if we consider its first-order difference 
in the estimations, results are not really affected (see Appendix 2). 
Appendix 3 reports tests of conditions of competition in interest revenues. The 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method provides the estimates. The results exhibit sta-
tistically significant coefficients for the labor input price variable, non-significant for 
the capital and funds inputs variables. With the exception of the BR variable, all con-
                                                        
5 Benefitting from its rank in the PNB Paribas Group, the bank offers a direct access to international trade 
centers network in 85 countries in the five continents.     
6 In December 31
st 2008, the capital of the ATB is 80.000.000 TND divided into 64.24 per cent for the 
Arab Bank PLC and 35.76 per cent for moral and physical resident persons. 
7 Starting from December 11
th 2006, the bank of the South became Attijari Bank of Tunisia. 
8 During the month of November 2002, the Groupe Société Générale acquires 52% of the bank’s capital, 
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trol variables are significant, associated with the hoped for signs which mentioned in 
the literature. The size of bank, for example is expected to positively affect bank’s 
interest revenues. Accordingly, size is associated with a generation of a revenue-
making economy of scale. It is the case of the SCALE and AG variables. As far as 
the risk variable (CAPAST), this latter has a negative sign.  
The H-statistic is measured by the sum of the coefficients of price input vari-
ables (b+c+d). This latter is estimated at 0.87. The labor price variable is positive and 
neatly significant as mentioned above. It is the variable that has the largest contribu-
tion in explaining interest revenues and the H-statistic.  
The estimations obtained from bank fixed effects and bank random effects 
General Least Square (GLS) models are compared to results mentioned in Appendix 
2. The H-statistic takes respectively the values 0.88 and 0.89 for the two methods 
adopted (see Appendix 4). Fisher’s Test signals that the H-statistic is significantly 
different from zero, and significantly close to 1. These results suggest that over the 
period 1990-2007, Tunisian banking sector is characterized by an oligopolistic com-
petition in a contestable market according to PR standards. The results therefore fa-
vour the existence of a competitive situation in opposition to other studies that set to 
assess the Panzar and Rosse model as applied to banking industry. Generally, these 
studies have pleaded in favour of a monopolistic situation (see Appendix 1).  
The theory of contestable markets is based on the fact that the degree of com-
petition is less determined by the number of enterprises than by the possibility of 
firms entering or exiting the market (William Baumol, John C. Panzar, and Robert 
Willig 1982). The theory of contestable markets assumes that the current number of 
competitors, and their respective shares in the market, are not important given that 
new competitors may enter the market without incurring costs. The threat of new 
competitors leads the market to leverage optimal prices among the structures of the 
potential market. Free circulation of resources inside and among markets justifies the 
presence of a competitive behaviour.  
Having said this, the importance attached to recent tendencies at the level of 
the Tunisian banking sector is justified and may affect what has been termed “market 
contestability”. Investigating modifications of the international financial context, as 
reflected in the dynamic changes, undergone by the Tunisian deposit banks, allows 
us to notice the will to move from a debt-oriented economy to a market economy, 
with a series of measures which aim at liberalizing the economy. Certainly, in this 
economy the transition period is still pending, however, certain market mechanisms 
start to function well.  
 
4.3.2 Tests of Conditions of Competition in Total Revenues 
 
The dependent variable is now represented by total revenues. This includes the as-
similated interests and revenues, the commissions over banking operations, profits on 
portfolios and financial operations, revenues on investment portfolios, operating pro-
visions made available and various products.  
The reduced form of the following specification is:  
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Concerning the variables related to the H-statistic, the results yield significant 
coefficients associated with inputs except for capital input. We notice predominance 
of the labor factor on the explanation of total revenues and the H-statistic. Concern-
ing the control variables, it is the variables size, number of branches and offices that 
are associated with significant coefficients. The coefficients of the risk variables are 
not conclusive (see Appendix 4). 
The H-statistic is estimated at 0.91 when estimated by OLS. Fisher’s test is ex-
tended over H-statistic and is statistically different from zero and equals 1. We con-
clude that although the H-statistic seems slightly superior according to the specifica-
tion total revenues in relation to interest revenue, the Tunisian banking market rejects 
a monopolistic competition and confirms presence of competitive conditions. The 
same observations are maintained for bank fixed effects and bank random effects 
GLS. The H-statistic within the first and second method respectively takes the values 
0.88 and 0.90 (see Appendix 4).  
The obtained results are in conformity with the studies of De Bandt and Davis 
(2000), Hauner and Peiris (2006) and Yuan (2006). Compared to the countries of the 
MENA region and Arab Gulf Cooperation Council countries, our findings are similar 
to those of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE as reported by Al-Muharrami, Mathews, 
and Khabari (2006), and to those of Bahrain and Turkey as reported by Turk-Ariss 
(2009). Measures of competitive conditions conducted by Kasekende et al. (2009) on 
the banking industry in the four largest African economies, mainly South Africa, Al-
geria, Nigeria and Egypt (SANE region), show findings which suggest that, although 
the degree of competition confirms a monopolistic competition for South Africa, 
commercial banks were increasingly facing competition from the growth of other 
providers in the financial services sector. Egyptian and Algerian commercial banking 
are characterized by a higher level of oligopoly than Cournot, though there is a 
higher level of competition than joint-profit maximization. In Nigeria, commercial 
banks are characterized by a certain level of oligopoly and are less competitive than 
Cournot. However, the study of Kasekende et al. (2009) shows that reforms in South 
Africa, Nigeria and Egypt, and financial restructuring in Algeria, have induced more 
competitiveness in the financial services sector. 
 
4.3.3 Equilibrium Test for the Tunisian Bank Market 
 
Since the PR model is only valid if the market is in equilibrium, in the initial equa-
tion we retain the same explanatory variables which we regress on the dependent 
variable ROA and ROE. Return on assets might take small negative values, that is 
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The equilibrium test consists of the idea which stipulates that return on bank 
assets should not be linked to input price. We define E1 as equilibrium statistics is-
sued from equation (5), and E2 as the statistic computed from equation (6). The equi-
librium statistics E1 and E2 are measured by the sum of the coefficients (b+c+d). We 
test then, using Fisher’s statistics, whether E1=0 and E2=0, which would allow us to 
examine whether the observations are in long-term equilibrium (see Appendix 5). 
Over the equilibrium equations in which the dependent variables are 
ln(1+ROA) and ln(1+ROE), Fisher’s test cannot reject the hypothesis that the pa-
rameter E1 is equal to zero and E2 is equal as well to zero. From another perspective, 
and from an economic viewpoint, the statistics E1 and E2 turn out to be close to zero. 
With reference to the two equilibrium tests, we can conclude that Tunisian bank 




The analysis of the relationship between structures of different markets (competitive 
or imperatively competitive) and bank performance has been enriched by recent stud-
ies treating the subject under a bimodal analysis, i.e. the non-structural approach vs 
the structural approach. Under the non-structural perspective, it is the behaviour of 
firms operating on the market that may provide us with an idea about the structure of 
the market. Between the two extremes, pure and perfect, and collusive competitive 
markets, lies the contestable market whose theoretical foundations are initiated by 
Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982). 
 The literature review reminds us of the main studies that have used different 
methods to measure and test bank competition. Among these studies, we have cited 
the works that directly treat competition within the banking system, notably the 
works of Claessens and Laeven (2004), Prasad and Ghosh (2005), Al-Muharrami, 
Mathews, and Khabari (2006), Yuan (2006), Gutiérrez de Rozas (2007), Kasekende 
et al. (2009) and Turk-Ariss (2009). 
Albeit, we have opted for Panzar and Rosse’s H-statistic, one of the main 
theories, which was able to model, measure and test bank competition, mainly a 
model issued from the new industrial organisation theory.  
We have delivered a series of empirical validations. The results of the estima-
tions in terms of interest revenue and total revenue have yielded very interesting ob-
servations. Proceeding by means of an OLS method, the H-statistics is respectively 
estimated at 0.87 and 0.91. The computations undertaken using bank fixed effects 
and bank random effects GLS methods yield similar results. These results support the 
idea that Tunisian deposit banks operate in a context of an oligopoly competition, in 
a contestable market according to PR standards. Thus, it confirms the presence of a 
competitive environment. 
  
 202  Sami Mensi 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2010, 2, pp. 189-207 
References  
 
Al-Muharrami, Saeed, Kent Mathews, and Yusuf Khabari. 2006. “Market  Structure and 
Competitive Conditions in the Arab GCC Banking System.” Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 30: 3487-3501. 
Baumol, William, John C. Panzar, and Robert Willig. 1982. Contestable Markets and the 
Theory of Industry Structure. New York: Harcourt College Pub. 
Bikker, Jacob A., and Johannes M. Groeneveld. 2000. “Competition and Concentration in 
the EU Banking Industry”. Kredit und Kapital, 33: 62-98. 
Bikker, Jacob A., and Katharina Haaf. 2000. “Measures of Competition and Concentration: 
A Review of the Literature.” Research Series Supervision 30, De Nederlandsche Bank 
Amsterdam. 
Bikker, Jacob A., and Katharina Haaf. 2002. “Competition, Concentration and their Rela-
tionship: An Empirical Analysis of the Banking Industry.” Journal of Banking and Fi-
nance, 26: 2191-2214. 
Bikker, Jacob A., Laura Spierdijk, and Paul Finnie. 2006. “Misspecification of the Panzar-
Rosse Model: Assessing Competition in the Banking Industry.” DNB Working Paper 
114. 
Bresnahan, Timothy F. 1982. “The Oligopoly Solution Concept is Identified.” Economic 
Letters, 10: 87-92. 
Casu, Barbara, and Claudia Girardone. 2006. “Bank Competition, Concentration and Effi-
ciency in the Single European Market.” The Manchester School, 74(4): 441-468. 
Central bank of Tunisia. 2009. Annual Report 2008. 
http://www.bct.gov.tn/bct/siteprod/documents/rapport_annuel_anglais.pdf. 
Claessens, Stijin, and Luc Laeven. 2004. “What Drives Bank Competition? Some Interna-
tional Evidence.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 36(3): 563-592. 
De Bandt, Olivier, and Philip E. Davis. 2000. “Competition, Contestability and Market 
Structure in European Banking Sectors on the Eve of EMU.” Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 24: 1045-1066. 
Gelos, Gaston R., and Jorge Roldos. 2004. “Consolidation and Market Structure in Emerg-
ing Market Banking Systems.” Emerging Market Review, 5(1): 39-59. 
Günalp, Burak, and Tuncay Çelik. 2006. “Competition in the Turkish Banking Industry.” 
Applied Economics, 38: 1335-1342. 
Gutiérrez de Rozas, Luis. 2007. “Testing for Competition in the Spanish Banking Industry: 
The Panzar-Rosse Approach Revisited.” Banco de Espana, Working Paper 0726. 
Hauner, David, and Shanaka J. Peiris. 2006. "Bank Efficiency and Competition in Low-
Income Countries: The Case of Uganda." IMF Working Papers 05/240. 
Hempell, Hannah S. 2002. “Testing for Competition among German Banks.” Economic Re-
search Centre, Deutsche Bundesbank, Discussion Paper 04/02. 
Im, Kyung So, Hashem M. Pesaran, and Shin Yongcheol. 1997. “Testing for Unit Roots in 
Heterogeneous Panels.” University of Cambridge Working Paper 9526. 
Kasekende, Louis, Kupukile Mlambo, Victor Murinde, and Tianshu Zhao. 2009. “Re-
structuring for Competitiveness: The Financial Services Sector in Africa’s Four Larg-
est Economies.” In Word Economic Reform: Africa Competitiveness Report 209, 49-
81. Washington DC: The World Bank. 203  Measurement of Competitiveness Degree in Tunisian Deposit Banks: An Application of the Panzar and Rosse Model 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2010, 2, pp. 189-207
Lau, Lawrence J. 1982. “On Identifying the Degree of Competitiveness from Industry Price 
and Output Data.” Economic Letters, 10: 93-99. 
Mamatzakis, Emmanuel, Christos Staikouras, and Anastasia Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki. 
2005. “Competition and Concentration in the Banking Sector of the South Eastern 
European Region.” Emerging Markets Review, 6: 192-209. 
Mattews, Kent, Victor Murinde, and Tianshu Zhao. 2007. “Competitive Conditions 
Among the Major British Banks.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 31: 2025-2042. 
Mkrtchyan, Armenuhi.  2005. “The Evolution of Competition in  Banking in a Transition  
Economy: An Application of the  Panzar-Rosse Model to Armenia.” European Jour-
nal of  Comparative Economics, 2: 67-82. 
Molyneux, Philip, John Thornton, and Michael D. Lloyd-Williams.  1994. “Competitive 
Conditions in European Banking.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 18: 33-45. 
Molyneux, Philip, John Thornton, and Michael D. Lloyd-Williams. 1996. “Competition 
and Market Contestability in Japanese Commercial Banking.” Journal of Economics 
and Business, 48: 33–45. 
Nathan, Alli, and Edwin H. Neave. 1989. “Competition and Contestability in Canada’s Fi-
nancial System: Empirical Results.” Canadian Journal of Economics, 22(3): 576-594. 
Negrin, Jose L., Enrique Batiz, Diadelfa Ocampo, and Pedro Struck. 2006. “Competition 
in the Mexican Banking System 2000-2005: A Disaggregated Analysis.” Paper pre-
sented at the Meetings of Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association 
(LACEA) and Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society (LAMES), 2-4 
November. 
Panzar, John C., and James N. Rosse. 1987. “Testing for Monopoly Equilibrium.” Journal 
of Industrial Economics, 25: 443-456. 
Prasad, Ananthakrishnan, and Saibal Ghosh. 2005. “Competition in Indian Banking.” IMF 
Working Paper 05-141. 
Shaffer, Sherrill. 1982. “A Non Structural Test for Competition in Financial Market in Bank 
Structure and Competition.” The Federal Reserve Bank Chicago Conference Proceed-
ings, 225-243. 
Shaffer, Sherrill. 1993. “A Test of Competition in Canadian Banking.” Journal of Money, 
Credit, and Banking, 25: 49–61. 
Smith, Robert, and David Tripe. 2001. “Competition and Contestability in New Zealand 
Banking System.” Paper presented at the 14
th Australian Finance and Banking Confer-
ence, Sydney. 
Turk-Ariss, Rima. 2009. “Competitive Behavior in Middle East and North Africa Banking 
Systems.” The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49(2): 693-710.  
Vesala, Jukka. 1995. “Testing for Competition in Banking: Behavioral Evidence from Fin-
land.” Bank of Finland Studies, Working Paper E:1. 
Yildirim, Semih H., and George C. Philippatos. 2007. “Competition and Contestability in 
Central and Eastern European Banking Markets.” Managerial Finance, 33(3): 195-
209. 
Yuan, Yuan. 2006. “The State of Competition of the Chinese Banking Industry.” Journal of 
Asian Economics, 17: 519-534. 
 
 204  Sami Mensi 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2010, 2, pp. 189-207 
Appendix 1     Panzar-Rosse Model Results in Other Studies 
 
Authors Countries  Years  Results 
Smith Robert and 
David Tripe (2001) 
New Zealand   1996-1999  MC 
Bikker and Haaf 
(2002) 
23 countries of the 
OCDE 
1998,… MC 
Hempell (2002)  Germany  1993-1998  MC 
Claessens and 
Laeven (2004) 
50 countries  1994-2001  MC 
Gelos and Roldos 
(2004) 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Czech Republic, Mex-














Armenia 1998-2002  MC 
Prasad and  
Ghosh (2005) 
India   1996-2004  MC 
Burak Günalp and 
Tuncay Çelik 
(2006) 
Italy 1990-2000  MC 
Al-Muharrami, 
Mathews,  
and Khabari (2006) 
GCC   1993-2002 
PC : Kuwait,  
Saudi Arabia et UAE 
MC : Bahrain and Qatar 
M : Oman 
Gutiérrez de Rozas 
(2007) 
Spain 1985-2005  MC 
Turk-Ariss (2009) 
12 MENA region  
countries 
2000-2006 
PC: Bahrain and Turkey 
M : North Africa  
countries 
MC: the other countries  







 205  Measurement of Competitiveness Degree in Tunisian Deposit Banks: An Application of the Panzar and Rosse Model 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2010, 2, pp. 189-207
Appendix 2     Unit Root Tests 
 
Variables t- Statistic Probability
ln IR  -4.5175  0.0003 
ln TR  -4.3461  0.0005 
ln PF  -5.3063  0.0000 
ln PL  -6.2096  0.0000 
ln PK  -6.5544  0.0000 
ln SCALE  -2.6418  0.0866 
ln CAPAST  -5.7342  0.0000 
ln BR  -6.5757  0.0000 
ln AG  -2.2814  0.1791 
ln (1+ROA)  -12.446  0.0000 




Appendix 3     Tests of Conditions of Competition in Interest Revenues and Total Revenues:  
 The  OLS  Method 
 
  Interest Revenues (IR)  Total Revenues (TR) 
Intercept   11.172 
(38.13)
***
12.366          
(55.04)
***





ln PL  0.810 
(17.49)
***
0.741           
(20.86)
***




ln SCALE   0.660 
(10.62)
***
0.733           
(15.37)
***















R-sq. 0.8881  0.9236 
Adj. R-sq.  0.8835  0.9205 
H=0 
F.statistic   68.12
a  127.87
a 
P. value   0.0000  0.0000 
H =1 
F.statistic   1.50
c  1.11
c 
P. value   0.2223  0.2936 
 
Notes:   Figures in parentheses are t- statistics. 
  *significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%.  
 a  significantly different from 0 on F test. 
 b  not significantly different from 0 on F test. 
 c  not significantly different from 1 on F test. 
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Appendix 4     Tests of Conditions of Competition in Interest Revenues and Total Revenues:  
  Bank Fixed Effects and Bank Random Effects GLS Methods 
 
  Interest Revenues (IR) Total Revenues (TR)
  Bank Fixed  
Effects 
Bank Random 





Effects GLS  
Intercept   11.250  
(30.29)
*** 
  12.507   
(43.63)
*** 










Ln PL  0.805 
(17.44)
***






0.719   
(20.48)
*** 

















0.712   
(10.28)
*** 






























R-sq.  0.8861  0.8868  0.9139  0.9204 
H=0 





P. value   0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
H =1 





P. value   0.2955  0.3008  0.1857  0.2260 
 
Notes:   Two empirical models are considered: fixed effect models and random effect  
    models. Based on the results of the Haussman test, tests of conditions of compe- 
    titions are run with random effects. Figures in parentheses are t- statistics. 
    *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
    a significantly different from 0 on F test. 
    b not significantly different from 0 on F test. 
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Appendix 5     Tests of Conditions of Equilibrium in Interest Revenues (IR) and Total Revenues (TR) 
 
  Interest Revenues (IR) Total Revenues (TR)
  In (1+ ROA) T.stat.  In (1+ ROE) T.stat. 
Intercept   -0.0099608  -0.74  -0.1857871  -0.73 
ln PF  -0.0003632  -0.12  -0.0121279  -0.21 
ln PL  0.0031763  1.50  0.0096508  0.24 
ln PK  0.0064261  3.93
***  0.1714947  5.53
*** 
ln SCALE   -0.0051536  -1.81
*  -0.0658539  -1.22 
ln CAPAST  0.0008616  0.37  -0.0307687  -0.70 
ln BR   -0.0003376  -0.19  -0.0263998  -0.78 
ln AG  0.0002486  0.09  0.0115507  0.22 
R-sq.  0.1780    0.1778   
Adj. R-sq.  0.1446    0.1444   
H=0 
F.statistic   3.65
b   3.40
b 
P. value   0.0576   0.0671 
 
Notes:   Based on the results of the Hausman test, tests of conditions of equilibrium are  
    run with random effects. Figures in parentheses are t- statistics. 
    *significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%. 
    a significantly different from 0 on F test. 
    b not significantly different from 0 on F test. 
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